THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND IDENTITY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF ‘DEFENCE’ IN THE UK

GABRIELA THOMPSON
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

ABSTRACT
Today, the notion of ‘defence’ and its practice differs greatly from the military-centric version of the twentieth century. To understand what this new, transformed ‘defence’ is, I have used my position within a well-respected defence and security think-tank to access those individuals who make the large, sweeping policy decisions as well as those who make the smaller, less newsworthy decisions. From these conversations I have found that a large part of the defence identity is being constructed around how the notion of ‘value’ is perceived in defence. I argue that the demilitarisation of defence in practice is a result of a fundamental shift in the UK’s defence identity—one which is made up of the identities of the numerous individuals who form the defence community as well as those members of the public who have expectations of what defence should be and/or do. Although there is a perceivable push to frame value as an ‘objective’ and ‘measurable’ fact, the conceptualisation of ‘defence’ is inherently linked to those personal values individual decision-makers hold—in particular, to the frames of reference which enable them to determine and legitimise their concept of ‘value’. In evoking the term ‘frames of reference’ I am recalling Foucault’s theory of ‘regimes of truth’, which, coupled with Lukes’ theory of the third dimension of power, form the pillars of the theoretical framework which underpins this research.

INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years we have seen a dramatic re-conceptualisation of ‘defence’ in the UK. This conceptual transformation has impacted how decisions are being made in the defence community as well as how it is being practiced. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s it was rare to see civilians on operation—as a matter of fact, the figures are negligible. However, fast-forward just over twenty years to the UK’s operations in Afghanistan, and we see that there are almost as many civilians on operation as military personnel. Many would automatically ascribe this shift in practice to budgetary pressures which mean that the military is no longer able to financially sustain in-house expertise, forcing the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to contract services as and when necessary. However, through observation of the defence community, I have become aware of alternative explanations; most notably that it is the consequence of a deeper shift in the mentality of the individuals that populate the defence community.

Despite a persistent desire to achieve ‘objectivity’, to create a single, fixed definition for ‘defence’ and its activities, today, more than ever, the dependency of ‘defence’ as a construct on the identities of the individuals which inhabit the community is clear. In less than a generation, how we explain defence has transformed dramatically so that individuals such as myself, who sought to ‘specialise’ in defence throughout their education, have had to learn to understand it in two different ways. When I was at university, I was taught that defence and security were all about the military, about wars and enemies. However, within a year of graduating, I joined the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), one of the world’s oldest and leading think-tanks, only to find that, in fact, they are all about ‘good management’. Rather than defence management consisting of primarily the management and support of military operations, the majority of what the defence community do today is find ways to minimise spending, discuss the extent to which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) can and should outsource, and criticise the inefficiency of existing contracts, with most of these activities being carried out in consultation with industry. Even if we accept that education tends to lag a little behind reality, we are still left with the fact that people of my lecturer’s generation, who practiced within the last twenty to thirty years, participated in an entirely different defence culture to that which I am in now.

This transformation is attributable not to the changing nature of the threat we face, but to a deep-rooted change that society has undergone: the shift in the frames of reference by which each individual legitimises his or her expectations of him- or herself and others. What we ‘value’ today as individuals and its translation in to what we consider ‘value’ in defence is indicative of the extent of the impact identity has on this big, abstract notion. The wholesale adoption of private-sector models in the public sector, and the widespread belief within individuals that they are inherently ‘good’ and universalisable are what have prompted this large-scale change. And it is the continuing repetition of performances and speech acts, essentially expressions of the individuals’ identities that continue to legitimise this narrative and serve to maintain its dominance within defence.
METHODOLOGY
My theoretical framework is best illustrated by Foucault’s metaphor of the Panopticon. (1979) The idea is originally that of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham who was tasked with designing the perfect prison. Bentham came up with the panopticon design whereby the cells are built on multiple levels around a central watchtower. (Figure 1) In this way, all cells can see the watchtower and can be seen from it. In Foucault’s metaphor the watchtower is covered in reflective glass so that all cells can be seen from within the tower but not from without. Instead, from each cell, the prisoners can only see the reflection of the interior of the other cells as well as their own. We can apply the metaphor to the defence community by placing each of the agents of defence within the structure: the dominant managerial narrative sits in the watchtower making it empty of any human agent, and each cell is filled with key stakeholders such as politicians, military personnel and industrialists who in their reflections in the glass of the tower collectively form a group, coexisting within the defence cultural group.

Figure 1: The Panoptical Design

In finding their identity, a newcomer learns the community’s rules which includes the regulation of behaviours as well as hierarchies of authority, all of which form part of the ‘realities’ of defence, by observing the behaviour of others in the reflective glass and mimicking. Through constant performances, the new-comer ceases to need to mimic but begins to embody the culture in his or her performance of his or her identity. “As performance acts, these episodes are part of regulatory practices that produce social categories and the norms of membership within them. They are sites where hegemonic definitions of the collective body relate to multiple injunctions of the individual bodies’”. (Fortier, 1999: 43) These performances will then inform the individuals’ behaviour in future, prompting the institutionalisation of the latter through habitualisation. Thus, a mentality of governance is established, becoming the reference point for the formation and establishment of truths, encasing and limiting the ways in which we as agents are able to conceive of the manner in which the performance of defence can be constructed.

In the Panopticon, power is everywhere: it is in the physical structure as well as in the interactions, both verbal and through body language, between resident agents. This is conceptualised in Lukes’ (1974) third dimension of power: unconscious and collective power. As the watchtower is in fact empty of a human agent, the belief within each individual that there is a figure of authority within it results in a form of self-censorship which stops each agent from behaving in a manner which they believe will be disapproved of. In addition, the prisoners form a group in their reflections through which they inadvertently apply pressure on one another to conform by making each other feel watched, conformity being desirable simply because it legitimised ones membership of a community. The result is that, without the application of any violence or coercion, every member of the
community conforms and thus maintains the corresponding frames of reference of the dominant narrative. “Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions—whatever the actual agency of that enforcement”. (Parsons, 1963: 237) The only way to identify the role of identity in the application of power is through observation, enabling the researcher to use unconscious actions and interactions of the social context— “the universe of reference and socialization in which interactions take on meaning for their participants”— (Weber, 2001: 485) which the subjects are unable to communicate in an interview due to their lack of awareness of them as data. In my role as observer, I sought firstly to systematically describe those factors which contribute to the defence discourse: events, behaviours and artefacts within the defence context. (Marshall & Rossman, 1989) These are first order concepts. Second order concepts, however, require the observer to identify and interpret behaviours taken for granted by the participants. These are “matters as seen as deeply embedded in the commonsensical though unarticulated understandings carried by virtually all members... ‘background expectancies’ and as such they must always be inferred”. (Van Maanen, 1979: 541) It is here the researcher becomes relevant to the research as his or her observations are interpreted according to his or her knowledge and frames of understanding. (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999) In my research, it is the education I have received, my form of ‘specialisation’ in defence and security (through my education), my position as researcher within the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and many other factors which have framed my interpretations. Research has traditionally been conceived as an ‘objective’ activity which requires the unbiased ‘collection’ and analysis of data. However, the observational method requires that the researcher make clear and always be aware of their influence and bias. In my research, I have not been merely a ‘collector’ of data as every time I note down something of importance I am interpreting its value to my research and thus analysing simultaneously. In collecting data, I am implementing my own form of exclusionary practices according to my own frames of reference. “The ethnographer’s own taken-for-granted understandings of the social world under scrutiny are also tied closely to the nature and quality of the data produced.” (Van Maanen, 1979: 547) Therefore, the act of my doing this research alone is illustrative of how the identities of individuals within the defence community contribute to the collective understanding and explanation of defence since, as a researcher in defence, the aim of my endeavour is to inform and influence it. In addition, in order to gain a better understanding of how the defence community wishes to portray ‘defence’ and its practice in the UK today, I carried out an analysis of a selection of relevant documents published throughout the calendar year 2015 by official bodies representing the government. As I am seeking to understand the intricacies behind the dominance of a particular narrative in a particular time and space, the analysis of relevant documents provides a spring-board from which to glean the dominant themes and issues in UK defence today by providing information on the context in which my participants operate. (Bowen, 2009: 29)

Value for Defence?
A good indicator of how we understand or conceptualise ‘defence’ can be found in what we consider ‘value’ to mean in its context. So what are the indicators to be found in documents and conversation which hint at the way in which we, as members of the defence community, feel it is legitimate to practice defence? To me, intuitively, if we are talking about the British defence identity the first thing that comes to mind is that Britishness is key. I need not define this, however, as none of my respondents allude to this nor does it arise in any of the documents I have analysed post-1997. In contrast, the 1996 British Defence Doctrine is full of allusions to the British nation and values. The document makes clear that “it [was] important that the armed forces should not become alien institutions with markedly different values and goals from the rest of society.” (1996: 5.10) By representing society, “the armed forces provide[d] an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the Nation. They promote[d] the ideals of integrity, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence... embody[ing] much tradition, which help[ed] promote a sense of regional and national identity.” (1996: 5.10) The only moment at which I have been able to approach the subject of Britishness was during an informal conversation with someone of little influence within the community. Nevertheless, I have been able to bring up the issues of patriotism and victory with some respondents. One of my respondents, a career academic within the military, bluntly told me that victory was now irrelevant without explaining why, adding that patriotism can no longer be evoked as today’s globalised world requires us to think in terms of inter-dependency rather than sovereignty. Another looked bemused when I asked what role these notions played in how we practice defence today. The reaction to my allusion to these only supports the above criteria, as invariably my respondents dismissed questions on the matter indicating or verbalising that they are irrelevant in today’s globalised world. Thus it is this—globalisation—that has replaced Britishness as core to the British defence identity.
Globalisation is mentioned repeatedly, not just in conversation and conference presentations, but also in official documents. Key members of the defence community and organisations under the authority of the MoD will speak at length about building a culture open to partnering, both with foreign government’s as well as multi-national companies (MNCs). According to the House of Commons Defence Committee (HoCDC) “'[d]ecision-making is the act of identifying the alternatives available, and choosing between those alternatives based on the values and preferences of the decision-maker.’” (2015: 23) The NAO adds that “'[w]here the Department does not sufficiently understand interdependencies this can undermine its ability to manage risks’”. (2015b: 16) These assertions and actions indicate that today there is a deliberate drive to ensure that members of the community, from the bottom to the top, understand the importance of partnering and are able to conceive of and defend solutions to problems based on the partnering model. The approach is not one which has grown from its adequacy to defence but rather from the mentality that partnering is universally beneficial. Since the end of WWII, the military and thus defence, particularly with the formation of the modern MoD as a formal ministry in the 1960s, has been extensively professionalised. The idea of the professional retains its centrality to defence, however, it has taken on entirely different connotations. Prior to 1997, the professional in defence was primarily military with all the training and expertise that this entails, today the military professional is less and less a part of ‘defence’. From the reform documents we can see that there has been a concerted drive to decrease the level of influence the military has in decision-making circles, as evidenced by the exclusion of the Single-Service Chiefs from the National Security Council (NSC), with the entire military now being represented by a single individual. Simultaneously, those defence professionals I have spoken to, including numerous with military backgrounds, have minimised their military identities in order to be part of the defence decision-making community. One of my participants, for example, whom I lunched with at a conference, despite spending most of his career in the military, feels that industry is better placed to make decisions with only management issues being dealt with in the MoD. It is not my impression that this has been enforced on my respondent, but rather that he does not feel that the military belongs in Whitehall. Instead, a competent professional today is a manager. To test this assertion, I decided to look into the kinds of professionals the MoD is recruiting (review undertaken in the summer of 2015). Accessing the MoD website and clicking on the ‘jobs’ link took me to a general website for all civil service jobs. On this page, I could choose to search for jobs according to my location or to apply for one of the numerous employment programmes—e.g. graduate or summer schemes. For the latter, we can be certain of one thing: they were not looking for defence experts, as, for the schemes, all that was required was a decent set of A-Levels and/ or a 2:2 degree in any subject. However, if I chose to search for a job specifically for the MoD anywhere in the UK, I am awarded with a list of 165 vacancies. Out of these I could discard any specialist medical, engineering or financial jobs and unskilled roles (e.g. store assistant) as these are, of course, skill sets that are similar (with differences learnt on the job) in both the defence and civilian sector. By my own analysis, and using the parameters of my own interpretation of a defence specialist or expert, the vast majority of remaining roles did not require defence specialists at all, but rather insisted on a variety of generic competencies which are fashionably required in almost any role in any sector today. For example: Leading and Communicating, Collaborating and Partnering, Making Effective Decisions, Seeing the Big Picture, Delivering Value for Money, Making Effective Decisions, and Managing a Quality Service. As a matter of fact, by my own count and interpretation there were roughly five non-specialist roles advertised (primarily for managers or “project professionals”) for every one defence specialist role. Many of those whom I spoke with alluded to their own abilities to manage as a virtue or to the lack of others’ to do so (particularly the MoD) as a primary failing of defence. A former head of human resources in the British military is a prime example, as most of my conversation with him during a dinner revolved around the lack of the MoD’s ability to manage talent within its existing employees, implying that it takes an individual with extraordinary management skills to change this ingrained cultural failing. Although in and of itself, the ability to manage is not particularly contrary to the twentieth century narrative of defence as all leadership skills require an element of management, it is the construction of the idea of ‘good management’ which differentiates the identity of the defence professional of today from that of the mid- to late-twentieth century. This cannot be identified in conversation with participants as they take for granted what they mean by ‘good management’, expecting me to know and thus offering no explanation. Instead I looked to competency frameworks for the MoD civil service as well as within military training. From this I learnt that ‘good management’ is conceived as a universalisable skill which can be applied in any sector, completely eliminating the exclusivity of defence
which was so inherent to the prior conceptualisation. Crucially, the notion of ‘good management’ is directly lifted from the private sector model of management, which defence professionals consider a virtue as it enables them to facilitate successful partnering through the identification of common ground between sectors. One of the ways the MoD has sought to do this is by creating a standardised costing method for contracts. As a part of this goal, the Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO) has worked on establishing a standardised methodology for calculating baseline profit rates (BPR) for qualifying defence contracts (QDC) which incorporates all sectors thus is specific to business not defence. “The analysis we produce will be based on a range of evidence and will generate comparative management information and defence benchmarks and parametres. This data can be used by the MOD to work with industry to negotiate and manage contracts in a manner more closely aligned with the aims of the Defence Reform Act.” (SSRO, 2015: 19)

‘Value’, in sum, is less in function of defence today as it is in function of the universal ideal of inter-dependency and ‘good management’. The ability for the notion of ‘value’ to change so easily demonstrates that defence is not a static idea, standing separate from those who practice it, but rather a result of the expression of what the latter ‘value’ at any given time in history. But why can defence not be ‘objectively’ separated from the individuals’ identities?

One Grain of Sand...

Our ability to be powerful is inescapable as “subjects are attached to power because their interiorities—the desires and motivations that seem to characterize one’s very individuality—arise through participation in power relations.” (Bell, 2007: 22) Thus, “[t]o be a human being is to be an agent... and to be an agent is to have power... [and] the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them.” (Giddens, 1992: 7) One of our initial acts of power over others is in expressing our identities, which “obliges [us] to organize [our] embodiment and, perhaps more accurately, [our] sense of inwardsness, in accordance with [powers’] attentions.” (Bell, 2012: 3) As we express our identity to others and enable it to direct our work, our social interactions and our personal lives, we are expressing what to us is legitimate and thus creating an expectation that others will respond in kind. “The boundaries we articulate and the exclusions that we thereby perform are simultaneously ones about relevance and about ethics; since many different possibilities for (intra-) acting exist at every moment.” (Bell, 2012: 11)

Throughout our lifetime, our ability to continue within the legitimate and to expect the same from others increases in importance as we involve ourselves more and more in different cultures—we start with only our family culture, and then we begin to add educational, social, professional cultures to our lives as well as many others. As membership to these cultures is contingent on a shared ideology, “to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might be... is... to risk unrecognizability as a subject”. (Butler, 2005: 23) Thus, “refraining from questioning doesn’t look like a political act”, (Schmidt, 2001: 35) but in reality, it is an expression of our willingness to maintain the status quo. I can give a personal example of this as it is something I face almost daily. As a newcomer to the UK defence community, coming from an educational background in law and politics, I repeatedly feel inadequate at conferences and meetings due to my lack of ability to understand and communicate in managerial terms. I am personally baffled at the predominance of managerial language in UK defence rather than question its relevance I often choose to remain silent. Inevitably, my silence leads to the impression in others that I subscribe to their same ideological approach to defence and that any issues I may wish to discuss which fall outside the managerial bounds of discussion are not raised and remain unaddressed. These situations and these reactions arise daily in all our lives, so much so, that we no longer take notice of them. But this is one of the strongest ways in which we exercise our power to maintain the dominant narrative and it works so well precisely because we do not need to do it consciously thus do it more often than we are aware of. This assertion is also supported by the work of experimental psychologists. Bruce Hood writes that “mere exposure to words triggers thoughts that for a moment can influence our behaviours.” (2011: 154) Thus, “[t]he most important vehicle of reality-maintenance is conversation... as it takes place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted.” (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 172) Whenever we interact with one another we are adhering to the narrative and expressing to those around us that we subscribe. The more of us who do this, the more we place those who do not subscribe to the same mode of thinking in a minority. In itself this is a pressure to conform that we do not intend to put on others, but it is also a large part of the limited education that we are imparting on those still learning their identity. Thus, “[e]ach proposes something for the next to repeat because everyone believes the other has the same expectation” and, in doing so, “[e]very person, individually, by accepting the rules of the game... allows that system to continue.” (Forti, 2014: 196)

With group cohesion being the main motivation of all individuals in the group, blending in seamlessly and creating as little disturbance as possible will be their strategy. “Within a social group setting, one is more likely to get on harmoniously with others in the group if one is behaving similarly to them... Thus, it makes sense for
the default behavioural tendency in an interaction to be based on one’s perception of what the other person is doing.” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 467) As a matter of fact, the more fiercely we defend a regime of truth the more we will be liked as “[f] there is nothing more respected—and even liked—than a persistent and successful pursuit of one’s peculiar aims, so long as this is done within the accepted limits of fairness and consideration for others.” (Cooley, 1922: 212) These unspoken rules which draw out boundaries to the behaviours we are allowed to indulge in when we are part of a group are what Goleman, a psychologist specialising in brain science, refers to as ‘schemas’: “the group self entails a set of schemas that define the world as it pertains to the group, that make sense of collective experience, that define what is pertinent” and “[f] it is the activation of shared schemas that unites the ‘we’; the more such a common understanding is shared, the more stable the group.” (1998: 163) We do not deviate from these schemas as such behaviour would mean running the risk of exclusion: “[p]erformances that do not serve to reinforce this law are repressed, mocked, denied recognition”. (Loxley, 2007: 120) Whenever we do, either by accident or in the spirit of rebellion, act in contravention to the silently agreed schemas, the fear is that the group will react by either ignoring the act, ignoring us, or by mocking. This way, every agent will “walk in line because of the extreme narrowness of the place where one can listen and make oneself heard”. (Foucault, 1988: 327)

Expressing Identities to Practice Defence

Only twenty years ago, the extent of privatisation that we are witnessing today was inconceivable. Indeed, there was a narrow focus on self-sufficiency within the military for which there was no alternative. Everyone within the defence community automatically adhered to this ‘traditional’ model of defence management. However, with the introduction of the New Public Management (NPM) model in the 1980s and the growth of a caste of managers employed to implement it in the 1990s, came the instilment of the idea that management as opposed to administration is inherently virtuous. As a result, today, there is very little argument as to the virtue of privatisation and business-models, only over the extent to which it should occur. How did this change happen?

Bruce Hood (2011), an experimental psychologist, posits that as humans the biggest change that occurs through learning is the perceived necessity and ability to inhibit our own behaviour. Michel Foucault (in Kritzman, 1988) philosophically theorised this same idea, coining the terms internal and external exclusions. His theory is based on the idea that according to our social contexts we tailor our identities by internally excluding certain ideas and behaviours which we, by observing the behaviour of others, deem inappropriate. Therefore, in any given community, there are implicit rules which we impose upon ourselves by observing how others behave, and by our adherence to such rules, unconsciously impose these rules on others.

If we begin by referring to our social contexts as our ‘cultures’ we can extract this notion from the abstract and begin to apply it to our realities. Erich Fromm, a renowned psychologist and critical theorist, asserted that “[m] an’s nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort”. (2004: 9) At the risk of over simplifying, I conceive our identities as being subject to a continuous cycle of learning, nonconscious mimicry, and automatic conformity. In order for my identity to form, culture provides a normative framework which “not only... direct[s] my conduct but... condition[s] the possible emergence of an encounter between myself and the other.” (Butler, 2005: 25) It is these frameworks that we learn and which become the building blocks of our identities as well as the frames of reference for interpreting our experiences. These cultural frameworks were conceptualised by Foucault as ‘regimes of truth’— “a regime of truth offers the terms that make self-recognition possible. These terms are outside the subject to some degree, but they are also presented as the available norms through which self-regulation can take place, so that what I can “be,” quite literally, is constrained in advance by a regime of truth that decided what will and will not be a recognizable form of being.” (Butler, 2005: 22) Having learnt the legitimate behaviours associated with our cultural groups, we begin to nonconsciously mimic the actions of those who conform and whom we aspire to identify with. Chartrand & Bargh refer to this as the Chameleon Effect—the "mechanism behind mimicry and behavioural coordination and thereby [the] source of the observed smoother social interaction and interpersonal bonding". (1999: 897) As a result, “the reality of everyday life is ongoingly reaffirmed in the individuals interaction with others” (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 169) as “[g]roups provide individuals with frameworks within which their memories are localised”. (Connerton, 2013: 37)

Nonconscious mimicry in cultural groups then becomes automatic conformity, but, by virtue of its nonconscious character it is impossible to identify when this occurs. From a psychologist’s perspective, automatic conformity differs from the learning and nonconscious mimicry stage in that, at the point of learning we are making a conscious decision to understand how to become a member of the cultural group, and when nonconsciously mimicking we are simply ‘fitting in’ the way in which our brains know to, but at the point of automatic conformity there is "a bias in perception [which] implies an unconscious center at work in the
mind, imposing its judgement on all we perceive, shaping our experiences to fit its priorities.” (Goleman, 1998: 62) "[T]hat information is scanned for meaning before it reaches the filter... [shows] the filter seems to have some intelligence; it is tuned by the importance to a person of a message”—(Goleman, 1998: 64) an importance which is defined by the previous processes of learning and nonconscious mimicry. In essence, the practice of a culture becomes the expression of our identities. This means that each one of us has an impact on the identities of those we interact with in future as with every experience and interaction we have and with the peculiarity of how we react to them, we are reinforcing or modifying our cultures and thus the culture of others.

By accepting that, with the exception of obvious biological limitations, we impose upon ourselves limitations which grow to delineate our identities according to what we have learnt from our cultural surroundings, we find that “[a]ur identities are not given by nature or simply represented or expressed in culture: instead, culture is the process of identity formation”. (Loxley, 2007: 118) For example, in today’s UK defence culture the notion of ‘victory’ has been replaced by that of ‘success’. Most individuals who now work within its decision-making circles will not use the word ‘victory’ or ‘winning’ but rather refer to ‘successes’ which are measured by the extent to which a goal has been achieved. In an opening keynote speech at a 2015 conference, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS) openly confirmed this, stating: “it is no longer enough to talk in straight forward terms, with terms like ‘defeat’ and ‘victory’... success now tends to be judged through the management of perception”. Instead, he referred to the ‘tactical success’ the UK achieved in Afghanistan. The reason for this is that success can be measured against pre-determined indicators represented by numerical symbols. Success therefore is almost always achievable; the question is merely ‘how successful have we been?’ This is a symptom of the need to be objective, removing all subjective and emotive elements from defence such as ‘winning’ in a bid to legitimise the governance of operations. Similarly, Secretary of State for Defence in the summer of 2015, in his closing remarks at a different conference insisted that the bringing together of all the component elements of defence into one strategy (labelled the Whole Force Approach) is integral to the success of UK defence. Understanding and providing for the defence ecosystem as a whole made up of equal parts rather than as a hierarchical, linear system, will lead to cost-savings and more efficient processes. His speech made clear that defence is succeeding in achieving efficiencies not winning wars.

On the other hand, during and after World War II, ‘victory’ and ‘winning’ were central to the rhetoric, evoking an emotional response in the form of total support for the forces from the public. The difference in language usage indicates that today’s defence culture is led by the ideal of objectivity and the adequacy of measurement as much as by its opposition to basing policy on emotional responses, indicating the rise in importance of the former in general society as well as in the minds of individuals. “[T]he way we hold ourselves, the way we speak, the spaces we occupy and how we occupy them, all in fact serve to create or bring about the multi-levelled self that these acts are so often taken merely to express or represent.” (Loxley, 2007: 118-119) By replicating the managerial language and reproducing its artefacts in practices, individuals create a never-ending cycle of self-legitimisation. For example, if we seek to measure success through performance indicators, we are limiting ourselves to an interpretation of success based on qualitative data and statistics. Furthermore, we are limiting the kind of people that can interpret and analyse what success is to statisticians.

The assertion that some form of behaviour or interpretation might be correct, moral and responsible, or even the recognition that something is a fact can "assert its transcendence, which is to say that it was there all along. It can do so because this fact emerges through certain specific devices and constraints that do not pertain to a 'raw' fact" (Bell, 2012: 9) Instead, the nature of the dominant narrative lends a ‘fact’ its legitimacy, filling the world “with frames that guide our awareness toward one aspect of experience and away from others. But we are so accustomed to their channelling our awareness that we rarely notice that they do so.” (Goleman, 1998: 202) The fourth edition of the British Defence Doctrine still spoke of duty, freedom and integrity (Ministry of Defence, 1996) as opposed to the three E’s—efficiency, effectiveness, economy—that pepper the latest Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence and Security Reviews (2010 & 2015). Today, however, we are hard pushed to hear non-managerial language in any official capacity, be it on the news or in official government publications. One of my respondent, a military educator, informed me that the clearest change in defence in the forty years he had worked in the community was a change in vocabulary. I asked him to expand earning a concise response: "The defence enterprise is fragmented." The way we have being trying to fix this, he explained, is by ensuring compatibility in language and practices. He himself, it became apparent, is perfectly compatible with, and able to speak fluently to, an industrialist at the top of his game despite his never having left the academic sphere. This is not uncommon especially since today pure academia is frowned upon and all academics must also be practitioners (e.g. consultants). Academia is considered to have no virtue unless it is ‘operationalisable’ (i.e. able to be implemented in practice). The result of funding academia only for practical purposes has meant limiting research, innovation and creativity to the existing sphere of thinking. In such an academic environment, we are bound to be promoting a whole legion of academics who whole-heartedly believe in the advantages of the
dominant school of thought as they are not encouraged, let alone funded, to criticise it. This is akin to the streamlining of civil service personnel into a managerial force as mentioned above. The impact of this is already clear. In conversation with a civil servant, it struck me that he still held this military-centric ideal of defence but was unable to articulate his thoughts in ways which veered away from the managerial. Efficiency, investments, contracting all seemed to be integral to the way in which he framed what defence is to him. As a matter of fact, he made clear to me that absolutely everything could be contracted out, including the front-line, as long as it could be ‘justified’, never once explaining what this meant. Nonetheless, he expressed a moral difficulty with accepting that the front-line might be contracted out, but asserted that he could never argue with ‘good reasoning’. The centrality of the individuals’ parameters of justifiability and legitimacy in the conceptualisation of ‘defence’ thus becomes clear and is illustrated in the transformation of ‘defence’. As per Thomas Lemke’s work, even those things we consider insentient form part of dominance maintenance patterns. The interpretations of insentient artefacts and how they are to be used are also limited by, and in turn limits, the narrative—this he calls new materialism whereby “matter itself is to be conceived as active, forceful and plural rather than passive, inactive and unitary... Central to this movement is the extension of the concept of agency and power to non-human nature.” (Lemke, 2014: 2) In the case of defence management, the non-human agents would be the schedule templates, endless forms that need to be filled out by bureaucrats in order to gain approval for acquisitions, for example, as well as the depiction of very human issues such as the human consequences of war in percentages. During a keynote, a senior member of the military, as many others had beforehand and have since, espoused the virtues and need to reach 2% spending of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence without giving an understanding of what this will be spent on. Thus, the question remains: how does spending 2% of GDP within itself improve security and contribute to defence? The only indication of any response to this issue in the SDSR comes in the form of an undetailed promise to reinvest in the Armed Forces: “We will allow the MOD to invest efficiency savings into the Armed Forces.” (HM Government, 2015: 27) At no point would I claim that I know how much it is necessary to spend on defence but I am more convinced by explanations as to what we need and how much it will amount to. And if this comes to less than 2%, is that not sufficient? Equally, if it comes to more, should we not be prepared to consider it?

All these moments are instances in which the individual’s expression of their identity contributes to the practice of defence in the UK and, therefore, the way it is understood.

CONCLUSION

The way we practice defence in the UK is a consequence of the repeated expressions of the individuals’ identities who populate the defence community. I have found through observation that the main indicator of this is in the way that the notion of ‘value’ in defence is conceived of: instead of sovereignty or national identity, today the focus is on globalisation and partnering; the professional is no longer of military expertise but rather a specialist in management; and ‘good management’ is based on the NPM model which prioritises efficiency, effectiveness and economy rather than the public administrative model of the twentieth century. This value system emanates from a deep shift in society’s mentality, separate from developments on defence. In essence, the transformation has occurred regardless of the environment in which we are practicing defence, in response to internal changes to the value systems of individuals.

The process by which this has occurred involves the unconscious and collective exercise of power. The daily interactions, repeated use of managerial language and deployment of managerial artefacts by individuals working in the defence community have moulded the way that defence is practiced, intrinsically linking the greater explanation of defence to their personal values. In addition, newcomers are not only unconsciously pre-selected for their ability to fit-in with the dominant culture, but, where there might be discrepancies, the ability for the community to collectively legitimise or delegitimise language and activities through their reactions, minimises the impact of those opinion and suggestions—expressions of identity within themselves—which fall outside the dominant cultures’ value system.

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